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   How	  did	  our	  representations	  of	  the	  world	  become	  hard	  and	  dry?	  Paul	  Carter1	  	  A	  call	  has	  gone	  out	  in	  Australian	  cultural	  studies	  over	  the	  last	  five	  years	  for	  practices	  of	   criticism	  which	  engage	  with	   the	  world	   in	  more	   fluid,	  dynamic,	   even	   speculative	  ways.	  Paul	  Carter	  asks	  this	  question	  of	  representations	  in	  his	  seminal	  Dark	  Writing.	  In	  putting	   forward	  an	  experimental	  critical	  practice,	  one	  which	  offers	  a	  subversive	  form	   of	   place-­‐making,	   Carter	   plays	   with	   narrative	   practices	   of	   constructing	  landscape	   in	   a	   non-­‐temporal	   and	   non-­‐linear	   context.	   Emily	   Potter	   responds	   to	  Carter’s	  work	  in	  discussing	  forms	  of	  place-­‐making	  in	  contemporary	  Australia.	  She	  is	  anxious	   about	   ‘one-­‐dimensional’	   and	   ‘self-­‐fulfilling’	   designs	   on	   contemporary	  Australian	   landscape,	   and	   calls	   for	   a	   ‘poetics’	   of	   place-­‐making	   which	   embraces	  connection	  and	  nuance	  within	  constructions	  of	  space.2	  She	  cites	  the	  design	  practice	  of	  Carter,	  highlighting	  his	  awareness	  of	   the	  subtleties	  of	   connectivity;	   in	  particular	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‘the	   phenomenological,	   ambiguous	   and	   highly	   interdependent	   “thisness	   of	   things”	  that	  cannot	  be	  apprehended	  by	  linear	  reason.’3	  Carter’s	  Dark	  Writing	  is	  an	  evocation	  of	   what	   is	   absent	   as	   much	   as	   what	   is	   present	   in	   our	   constructions	   of	   land	   and	  country.	  His	  work	  is	  suggestive	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  speculate	  in	  forms	  of	  creative	  or	  poetic	  connection	   and	   interaction	   with	   landscape,	   just	   as	   Potter’s	   adoption	   of	   his	   ideas	  illustrates	  the	  desire	  for	  a	  similar	  exploration	  to	  be	  taken	  up	  in	  criticism.	  Both	  Carter	  and	   Potter	   are	   inherently	   challenging	   critical	   practices	   in	   the	   Australian	   tradition.	  Furthermore,	   they	  are	  doing	   so	   from	  a	  position	  of	  unease	  with	   regards	   to	  existing	  forms	  of	  criticism.	  Lyn	  McCredden	  voices	  a	  desire	  for	   ‘new	  discourses’.4	  Her	  article	  ‘Haunted	   Identities	  and	   the	  Possible	  Futures	  of	   “Aust.	  Lit.”’	  discusses	   the	  nature	  of	  white	  Australian	   identity	  as	   ‘riven,	  needing	   to	  be	  understood	  always	   in	   relation	   to	  what	  [it	  is]	  not’,	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  and	  face	  the	  larger	  question	  of	  ‘what	  future-­‐oriented	  discourses	  might	  be	  possible	  in	  this	  haunted	  context’.5	  Her	  emphasis	  is	  not	  on	  what	  these	  theories	  of	  white	  Australian	  anxiety	  suggest	  in	  relation	  to	  literature,	  but	  how	  we	  might	  move	  forward	  through	  them.	  She	  calls	  for:	  	  developments	   in	  Australian	   literary	   critical	   debate	   that	   seek	   to	  negotiate	  and	  think	  through	  this	  rivenness,	  not	  to	  cure	  or	  placate	  it,	  but	  to	  discourse	  it	   towards	   the	   future.	   ‘Future’	   here	   is	   meant	   to	   imply,	   amongst	   many	  things,	   individual	   and	   communal	   identity,	   new	   ontological	   and	   social	  possibilities.6	  Ultimately,	  McCredden	  calls	  for	  us	  to	  ‘re-­‐imagine	  and	  re-­‐write	  the	  nation	  in	  ways	  that	  offer	  vital	  alternatives’.7	  Speculation	  is	  actively	  encouraged.	  There	   is	   a	   rising	   desire	   thus	   for	   subversive	   and	   radical	   practices	   in	  contemporary	   critical	   thought.	   But	  what	  might	   these	  practices	   look	   like?	  Different	  approaches	   have	   been	   put	   forward	   by	   various	   academics—take	   for	   example	   the	  work	   of	   Ross	   Gibson	   and	   Alison	   Ravenscroft.8	   I	   want	   to	   examine	   a	   ‘chain	   of	  reference’	   which	   would	   see	   our	   representations	   of	   the	   world	   revitalised,	   given	  agency	  and	  a	  greater	  respect.9	  In	  his	  recent	  work,	  Stephen	  Muecke	  draws	  on	  French	  philosophy,	   specifically	   that	   of	   Etienne	   Souriau	   and	   Bruno	   Latour,	   to	   argue	   for	   a	  ‘non-­‐judgemental’	  practice	  of	  criticism.10	  Muecke	  reaches	  towards	  a	  criticism	  which	  goes	  beyond	  the	  subject–object	  relationship	  in	  constructing	  its	  world	  view	  and	  thus	  aims	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  world(s)	  it	  considers.	  Etienne	  Souriau’s	  text	  Les	  différents	  
modes	  d’existence	  has	  featured	  little	  in	  critical	  studies	  since	  it	  was	  released	  mid	  last	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century.11	   But	   recent	   developments	   in	   cultural	   studies	   and	   philosophy—both	   in	  France	   and	   here	   in	   Australia—have	   returned	   attention	   to	   Souriau’s	   thought	   and	  brought	   it	   into	   relevance	   with	   current	   critical	   debate.	   In	   particular,	   the	   work	   of	  Latour	   with	   regards	   to	   Souriau	   has	   generated	  much	   interest.	   His	   latest	   book,	   the	  enormous	   An	   Inquiry	   into	   Modes	   of	   Existence,	   draws	   directly	   from	   Souriau’s	  philosophy.12	  It	  follows	  from	  We	  Have	  Never	  Been	  Modern	  in	  describing	  itself	  as	  ‘an	  anthropology	   of	   the	  moderns’,	   an	   effort	   ‘finally	   to	   learn	  what	   “we”	  Moderns	   have	  really	   been’,	   in	   order	   to	   ‘renegotiate	   that	   “we”	   from	   top	   to	  bottom—and	   thus	   also	  renegotiate	   what	   we	   might	   become	   with	   the	   “others”’.13	   Alongside	   Muecke’s	  engagement	   with	   Souriau,	   this	   points	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Souriau’s	   thought	  might	   be	   reactivated	   in	   contemporary	   studies.	   In	   challenging	   the	   subject–object	  relationship	   as	  definitive	   in	   critical	   discourse,	   Souriau’s	   existential	   and	  ontological	  pluralism	  has	  potential	  within	  Australian	  cultural	  studies	  to	  meet	  with	  the	  challenge	  raised	  by	  Carter	   and	  McCredden.	  Developing	   a	   general	   understanding	  of	   Souriau’s	  philosophy	  could	  further	  research	  in	  this	  direction.	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  article	  is	  to	  do	   just	   that,	   simultaneously	   acknowledging	   and	   responding	   to	   Latour’s	   critical	  analysis	  of	  Souriau’s	  work	  and	  suggesting	  the	  relevance	  of	  various	  elements	  of	  both	  within	  Australian	  cultural	  studies.	  Souriau	   wrote	   as	   a	   professor	   of	   aesthetics	   at	   the	   Sorbonne,	   during	   the	  turbulence	   of	   the	   era	   surrounding	  World	  War	   II.	   Luce	   de	   Vitry	  Maubrey	   suggests	  that	   he	   ‘has	   always	   been	   a	   lonely	   thinker’	   and	   that	   ‘contemporary	   French	  philosophers	   are	   [or	  were]	   far	   too	   taken	   up	  with	   decentralisation,	   deconstruction	  and	  the	  ontic	  nihilism	  of	  post-­‐structuralist	  game	  playing	  …	  to	  find	  time	  to	  look	  into	  Souriau’s	  seemingly	  “quaint”	  undertaking’.14	  Les	  modes	  was	   first	  published	  in	  1943	  during	  the	  Nazi	  occupation	  of	  Paris.	  Perhaps	  it	  was	  the	  timing,	  perhaps	  the	  difficulty	  of	   classifying	  his	  work	  or	   the	  opposition	  he	  met	  with	   from	  the	  philosophers	  of	  his	  day,	   but	   regardless	   of	   the	   reason,	   he	   became	   subject	   to	   an	   obscurity	   that	   Isabelle	  Stengers	   and	   Bruno	   Latour	   lament	   and	   label	   ‘radical’	   in	   the	   introduction	   of	   their	  2009	   edition	   of	  Les	  modes.15	   They	   describe	   it	   as	   the	   ‘forgotten	   text	   of	   a	   forgotten	  philosopher’.16	   It	   cannot	   have	   helped	   that	   his	   texts	   have	   not	   been	   translated	   into	  English,	   nor	   that	   Souriau’s	   language	   is	   ornate	   and	   complex,	   his	   writing	   prone	   to	  detours	  of	   thought.17	  Even	  Stengers	  and	  Latour	   see	  him	   thus:	   ‘Les	  différents	  modes	  
d’existence	  is	  a	  constricted	  book,	  concentrated,	  almost	  jumbled	  together,	  in	  which	  it	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is	  easy	  to	   lose	  oneself,	  so	  dense	  are	  the	  movements	  of	  thought	  and	  the	  vertiginous	  perspectives	  which	   ceaselessly	   threaten	   to	   derail	   a	   reader.’18	   From	  publication	   up	  until	   the	   1970s,	   when	   Vitry	   Maubrey	   took	   an	   interest,	   Les	   modes	   was	   largely	  ignored.	  Writing	  in	  1985	  (and	  having	  released	  her	  Le	  pensée	  cosmologique	  d’Etienne	  
Souriau	   a	   decade	   earlier	   in	   1974),	   Vitry	   Maubrey	   called	   for	   a	   revival	   of	   critical	  interest	   in	   Souriau’s	   philosophy,	   admonishing	   the	   tradition	   which	   had	   thus	   far	  overlooked	  his	  writings	  and	  his	  project,	  which	  she	  describes	  as	  ‘the	  rehabilitation	  of	  a	  knowledge	  rooted	  in	  being’.19	  She	  concludes:	  ‘Whatever	  the	  reasons	  …	  it	  is	  time	  for	  this	  passing	  over	  to	  cease.	  Not	  for	  Souriau’s	  sake,	  but	  for	  our	  own,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  new	   direction	   his	   cosmological	   vision	   offers…’20	   Vitry	   Maubrey	   sees	   Souriau’s	  project	  as	  valid,	  therefore,	  not	  only	  in	  its	  reconfiguration	  of	  Kant	  and	  Descartes,	  but	  in	   its	   application	  within	   contemporary	   philosophical	   studies.	   Stengers	   and	   Latour	  similarly	  see	  Souriau	  as	  holding	  currency	  with	  a	  contemporary	  audience.21	  Since	  the	  release	   of	   their	   edition	   of	  Les	  modes,	   awareness	   of	   Souriau’s	   philosophy	   has	   been	  growing.	   Various	   critics	   have	   taken	   interest,	   including	   Stephen	   Muecke,	   Frédéric	  Fruteau	  de	  Laclos	  and	  Adam	  Miller.22	  	  Half	   a	   century	   after	   its	   original	   release,	   Les	   modes	   still	   holds	   various	  philosophical	  positions	  which	  might	  be	  seen	  as	  radical.	  The	  opening	  sentences	  to	  the	  second	  chapter	  quietly	  reveal	  the	  underpinnings	  of	  his	  wider	  philosophy:	  	  To	   exist	   wholly,	   intensely,	   absolutely,	   what	   an	   ideal!	   To	   escape	   this	  incertitude	   of	   one’s	   self,	   the	   constant	   search	   in	   vain	   for	   certainty	   in	   the	  fogs	  of	  unreality,	  on	  the	  very	  edge	  of	  nothingness!	  …	  Is	  it	  true	  that	  one	  can	  only	  exist	  in	  half-­‐measures?	  That	  all	  things,	  a	  stone	  as	  much	  as	  a	  soul,	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  entering	  it,	  are	  equal	  in	  their	  existence?23	  	  These	   lines	   reveal	   his	   insistence	   on	   questioning	   the	   nature	   of	   existence,	   and	   the	  history	   of	   ontology	   in	   philosophy.	   They	   culminate	   in	   an	   idea	   central	   to	   Souriau’s	  thought:	   the	   concept	   that	   all	   forms	   of	   existence	   are	   equal	   in	   their	   autonomous	  capacity	   to	   produce.	   It	   is	   from	   this	   position	   that	   Souriau	   offers	   ‘his	   own	   brand	   of	  decentering’	   in	   his	   rationalisation	   of	   existence	   as	   moving	   beyond	   subject	   and	  object.24	  Les	  modes	  posits,	  as	  the	  title	  suggests,	  that	  there	  are	  multiple,	   interrelated	  modes	   of	   existence.	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   distinguishes	   between	   existing	   and	   being:	   ‘One	  can	  see	  …	  what	  a	  profound	  distance	  there	  is	  between	  an	  ontic	  pluralism	  (posing	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  beings)	  and	  an	  existential	  pluralism	  (posing	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  modes	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of	  existence)’.25	  It	  is	  the	  movement	  into	  being	  which	  Souriau	  uses	  to	  trace	  the	  modes	  of	   existence.	   Latour,	   in	   taking	   up	   Souriau’s	   work,	   notes	   the	   manner	   in	   which	  diversity	  is	  regularly	  relegated	  to	  language	  rather	  than	  ontological	  being.	  ‘Through	  a	  somewhat	  perverse	  mental	   restriction,	  on	   the	  one	  hand	  we	  acknowledge	   the	  most	  extreme	  diversities	  among	  these	  representations	  [‘manners	  of	  speaking’],	  while	  on	  the	  other	  we	  deny	  them	  any	  access	  to	  reality.’26	  We	  may,	  he	  suggests,	   ‘benefit	  from	  an	   ontological	   pluralism	   that	  will	   allow	  us	   to	   populate	   the	   cosmos	   in	   a	   somewhat	  richer	   way’.27	   But	   for	   his	   inquiry	   to	   function,	   he	   notes,	   ‘language	   has	   to	   be	  made	  capable	   of	   absorbing	   the	  pluralism	  of	   values’.28	   The	   value	   of	   Souriau’s	   philosophy,	  for	  Latour,	  is	  that	  it	  opens	  the	  way	  for	  this	  to	  happen.	  	  Souriau	   coins	   a	   term—instauration—to	   describe	   the	   movement	   into	   being	  which	  marks	  a	  modal	  existence.	  Vitry	  Maubrey	  defines	  instauration	  as	  the	  ‘ensemble	  of	   processes	   which	   lead	   to	   the	   moment	   wherein	   the	   presence,	   assurance	   and	  autonomy	  of	  existence	  conferred	  upon	  a	  certain	  being	  are	  incontestable’.29	  It	  is	  used,	  she	   suggests,	   in	   place	   of	  words	   such	   as	   invention	   and	   creation.	   ‘But	   creation,’	   she	  notes,	  ‘if	  one	  uses	  it	  in	  the	  strictest	  sense,	  indicates	  the	  act	  of	  drawing	  a	  being	  from	  nothing,	   an	   act	   which	   can	   only	   be	   understood	   in	   reference	   to	   a	   divine	   power.’30	  Instauration,	   then,	   is	  a	  movement	   into	  being	  which	  has	  the	  advantage	  of	  signifying	  an	  autonomous,	  anaphoric	  progress.	  Frédéric	  Fruteau	  de	  Laclos	  describes	   it	  as	  all-­‐encompassing:	   ‘neither	   the	   subject	  nor	   the	  object,	   neither	   the	   form	  of	   the	   thought	  nor	   the	  worked	  material,	   pre-­‐exist	   the	   act	   of	   instauration.	   The	   subject	   is	   no	  more	  assumed	   than	   the	   object	   is	   pre-­‐determined.’31	   Subject	   and	   object,	   he	   suggests,	   are	  ‘born’	   coterminously,	   of	   the	   same	   instaurative	   act.32	   Fruteau	   de	   Laclos	   differs	  slightly	  here	   from	  Latour’s	   response,	   in	   the	  emphasis	  he	  maintains	  on	   subject	   and	  object	  as	  configuring	  being.	  Latour	  calls	   it	  Souriau’s	   ‘most	   important	   innovation	   in	  philosophy’,	  in	  that	  Souriau	  connects	  thus	  ‘questions	  of	  language	  to	  the	  question	  of	  being’.33	  As	  Latour	  suggests,	   ‘we	  are	  usually	   in	   the	  habit	  of	  either	  asking	  questions	  about	   language	   or	   about	   ontology,	   a	   habit	   which	   is	   obviously	   the	   consequence	   of	  that	  bifurcation	  we	  want	  to	  bring	  to	  an	  end’.34	  In	  An	  Inquiry,	  Latour	  considers	  the	  act	  of	  ‘maintaining	  oneself	  in	  existence’	  as	  forcing	  us	  to	  acknowledge	  networks	  of	  beings	  in	   relation,	   and	   thus	   reconsider	   the	   distinction	   between	   minds	   and	   things.35	   ‘A	  knowing	  mind	   and	   a	   known	   thing	   are	   not	   at	   all	   what	   would	   be	   linked	   through	   a	  mysterious	  viaduct	  by	  the	  activity	  of	  knowledge;	   they	  are	  the	  progressive	  result	  of	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the	   extension	   of	   chains	   of	   reference	   …	   they	   both	   indeed	   arise	   from	   the	   same	  operation	  as	   the	   two	   sides	  of	   the	   same	  coin.’36	  This	   is	  where	  Souriau’s	  philosophy	  takes	  shape	  for	  Latour:	  Here	  is	  where	  we	  are	  going	  to	  begin	  to	  understand	  why	  our	  inquiry	  bears	  on	   modes	   of	   existence.	   At	   first	   glance,	   the	   idea	   of	   attributing	   the	   term	  ‘existence’	   to	   the	   two	   trajectories	   [those	  of	   chains	   of	   reference	   alongside	  	  reproduction]	   that	   cross	   paths	   can	   be	   surprising,	   because	   the	   tradition	  passed	  along	  to	  us	  asserts,	  rather,	  that	  there	  are	   ‘existents’	  on	  one	  side—Mont	  Aiguille,	   for	  example—and	  knowledge	  on	  the	  other	  …	  it	   is	  precisely	  this	   division	   of	   tasks	   whose	   relevance	   we	   shall	   have	   to	   challenge.	   The	  distribution	  is	  awkward	  on	  both	  sides…37	  Latour	   uses	   the	   metaphor	   of	   a	   map	   of	   Mont	   Aiguille	   to	   describe	   the	   composite	  networks	   in	  which	   subject	   and	   object	   are	   implicated.	   The	   bifurcation	   of	  map	   and	  mountain	  as	  subject	  and	  object	  is	  challenged	  as	  over-­‐simplifying	  the	  existences	  they	  supposedly	   represent.	   A	   lot	   more	   is	   involved	   in	   this	   network,	   not	   least	   ‘tourist	  offices,	   hotel	   chains,	   hiking	   boots	   [and]	   backpacks’.38	   To	   describe	   the	   relationship	  ongoing	   here,	   ‘we	   can	   never	   limit	   ourselves	   to	   two	   extreme	   points,	   the	   map	   and	  Mont	  Aiguille,	   the	  sign	  and	   the	   thing’.39	   Instead,	   the	   two	  are	   ‘both	  products	  arising	  from	   the	   lengthening	   and	   strengthening	   of	   the	   chain	   [of	   reference]’.40	   Latour	   later	  connects	   the	   steps	   and	   leaps	   through	   which	   this	   chain	   of	   reference	   exists	   to	   the	  notion	  of	  instauration	  in	  Souriau’s	  work.41	  Ultimately,	   Souriau	   seems	   to	   suggest,	   instauration	   does	   not	   demand	   a	  subjective	   and	   objective	   position,	   but	   instead	   emerges	   as	   the	   natural	   process	   of	  existential	  agency:	  Instauration	  and	  construction	  are	   clearly	   synonyms,	  but	   instauration	  has	  the	   distinct	   advantage	   of	  not	   dragging	   along	  with	   it	   all	   the	  metaphorical	  baggage	   of	   constructivism—which	   would	   in	   any	   case	   be	   an	   easy	   and	  almost	  automatic	  usage	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  work	  so	  obviously	  ‘constructed’	  by	   the	   artist.	  To	   speak	  of	   ‘instauration’	   is	   to	  prepare	   the	  mind	   to	   engage	  with	   the	   question	   of	   modality	   in	   quite	   the	   opposite	   way	   from	  constructivism.	  To	  say,	  for	  example,	  that	  a	  fact	  is	  ‘constructed’	  is	  inevitably	  (and	   they	   paid	  me	   good	  money	   to	   know	   this)	   to	   designate	   the	   knowing	  subject	  as	  the	  origin	  of	  the	  vector,	  as	  in	  the	  example	  of	  God	  the	  potter.	  But	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the	  opposite,	  to	  say	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art	  that	  it	  is	  the	  result	  of	  an	  instauration,	  is	  to	  get	  oneself	   ready	   to	   see	   the	  potter	  as	   the	  one	  who	  welcomes,	   gathers,	  prepares,	  explores	  and	   invents	   the	   form	  of	   the	  work,	  as	  one	  discovers	  or	  ‘invents’	  a	  treasure.42	  Souriau	  uses	  a	  description	  of	  the	  work	  of	  the	  potter	  in	  explaining	  this	  process,	  and	  suggests	  not	  only	   the	  power	  of	   the	  potter	  over	   the	   clay,	   but	   the	  power	  of	   the	   clay	  over	  the	  potter.	  The	  relationship	  between	  both	  agential	  forces	  is	  equal:	  ‘if	  there	  is	  an	  
instauration	   by	   the	   scholar	   or	   artist,	   then	   facts	   as	  much	   as	   works	   come	   together,	  resist,	  oblige—and	  their	  authors,	  the	  humans,	  have	  to	  be	  devoted	  to	  them,	  which	  of	  course	   doesn’t	   mean	   they	   act	   as	   simple	   catalysts	   for	   them’.43	   Instauration	   then	  requires	   involvement,	   but	   does	   not	   demand	   that	   existence-­‐to-­‐come	   be	   defined	   in	  relation	   to	   this	   involvement,	  nor	  need	   that	   involvement	  be	  human	  or	  exist	  only	   in	  the	  subjective	  mode.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Latour	  points	  out,	  instauration	  holds	  risk	  as	  well.	  The	   outcome	   cannot	   be	  predetermined,	   or	   the	   existence	  would	  be	   as	  well.	  No,	   for	  Latour,	  ‘there	  is	  one	  condition:	  the	  act	  of	  instauration	  has	  to	  provide	  the	  opportunity	  
to	   encounter	   beings	   capable	   of	   worrying	   you	   …	   Beings	   whose	   continuity,	  prolongation,	  extension	  would	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  a	  certain	  number	  of	  uncertainties,	  discontinuities,	   anxieties,	   so	   that	   we	   never	   lose	   sight	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   their	  instauration	   could	   fail	   if	   the	   artist	   didn’t	  manage	   to	   grasp	   them	  according	   to	   their	  own	   interpretive	   key…’44	   This	   suggestion	   of	   an	   ‘interpretive	   key’	   also	   signals	   the	  respect	  which	  must	  be	  afforded	  to	  the	  existence-­‐to-­‐come.	  The	  notion	  of	  instauration	  is	  met	  by	  Souriau’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  modes.	   Without	   suggesting	   a	   relationship	   of	   power—there	   are	   no	   stronger	   or	  weaker	   forms—Souriau	   does	   differentiate	   between	   two	   different	   ‘genres’	   of	  existence:	   that	   of	   aseity	   and	   that	   of	   abaleity.45	   This	   difference	   is	   in	  how	   the	   being	  comes	   into	   existence:	   ‘With	   aseity,	   one	   speaks	   of	   existence	   in	   and	   of	   itself,	  independent,	  absolute	  in	  its	  mode;	  with	  abaleity,	  referential	  existence.’46	  But	  the	  two	  function	  interactively:	  ‘In	  the	  relationship	  of	  one	  to	  the	  other,	  that	  can	  be	  discerned	  in	  all	  beings	  and	  which	  I	  can	  discern	  in	  myself,	  the	  existential	  responsibility	  can	  be	  carried	  by	  either	  …	  changing	   the	  balance	  of	   the	  being.’47	  Thus,	  we	  understand	  our	  own	   human	   existence	   as	   aseitic,	   biologically	   independent,	   in	   responding	   to	   our	  empirical	  experience	  of	  reality.	  But	  these	  experiences	  and	  the	  world	  around	  us	  have	  their	  own	  abaleitic	  existence,	  which	  supports	  ours	  in	  our	  relations	  to	  them.	  We	  can	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see	  then	  just	  how	  abaleitic	  existence	  holds	  agency	  and	  the	  power	  to	  instaure.	  This	  is	  what	   Fruteau	   de	   Laclos	   refers	   to	   as	   the	   ‘co-­‐birth’	   of	   subject	   and	   object	   through	  instauration.48	  Latour	  picks	  up	  a	  similar	   idea	   in	  approaching	   the	   ‘beings	  of	   fiction’,	  noting	  that	  ‘they	  need	  our	  solicitude’	  to	  maintain	  existence.49	  But	  this	  does	  not	  deny	  them	   agency:	   ‘Without	   any	   doubt,	   there	   is	   some	   exteriority	   among	   the	   beings	   of	  fiction:	   they	   impose	   themselves	   on	   us	   after	   imposing	   themselves	   on	   those	  responsible	  for	  their	  instauration.’50	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  they	  offer	  to	  our	  existence:	  If	  the	  work	  needs	  a	  subjective	  interpretation,	  it	  is	  in	  a	  very	  special	  sense	  of	  the	   adjective:	   we	   are	   subject	   to	   it,	   or	   rather	   we	   win	   our	   subjectivity	  through	   it.	   Someone	   who	   says	   ‘I	   love	   Bach’	   becomes	   in	   part	   a	   subject	  capable	  of	  loving	  that	  music;	  he	  receives	  from	  Bach.51	  In	  Souriau’s	  terms,	  then,	  while	  the	  beings	  of	  fiction	  are	  abaleitic	  in	  their	  instauration,	  they	  contribute	  to	  the	  continuation	  of	  our	  own	  (aseitic)	   instaurations	  as	  subjective	  beings.	  The	  relationship	  is	  equal	  and	  dynamic,	  and	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  beings	  of	  fiction,	  becomes	  reciprocal—their	  existence	  ‘depends	  in	  their	  being	  reprised,	  taken	  up	  again	  by	  subjectivities	  that	  would	  not	  exist	  themselves	  if	  these	  beings	  had	  not	  given	  them	  to	  us’.52	  The	   multiple	   modes,	   whether	   abaleitic	   or	   aseitic,	   function	   thus	   in	   relation	  rather	  than	  comparatively	  to	  each	  other.	  Souriau	  further	  emphasises	  that	  these	  two	  genres	   are	   equal	   in	   that	   ‘all	   beings	   find	   themselves	   initially	   in	   a	   given	   situation,	  which	   they	  do	  not	   have	   a	   choice	   of	   refusing	  or	   accepting.	  This	   is	  what	   constitutes	  existence.’53	   Each	   and	   every	   mode	   of	   existence	   ‘has	   the	   same	   dignity	   as	   all	   the	  others’.54	  Because	  without	  this	  equality	  across	  modes,	  without	  taking	  each	  mode	  in	  its	  own	   right,	   there	   could	  be	  no	  existence,	   ‘no	  more	   than	   there	  would	  be	  Art	  pure	  without	   the	  statues,	   the	  paintings,	   the	  symphonies,	   the	  poems.	  Because	  Art,	   that	   is	  all	   the	  arts.	  And	  existence,	   that	   is	  each	  of	   the	  modes	  of	  existence.’55	   In	  choosing	   to	  consider	   existence	   as	   instaured,	   the	   alternative	   possibility	   that	   it	   must	   instead	  proceed	  directly	  from	  something	  or	  someone	  is	  undermined.	  What	  falls	  away,	  Latour	  suggests,	  is:	  the	  idea,	  which	  in	  the	  end	  is	  pretty	  preposterous,	  of	  a	  spirit	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  the	   action	   and	   whose	   consistency	   is	   then	   carried	   by	   ricochet	   onto	   a	  material	   which	   has	   no	   other	   maintenance,	   no	   other	   ontological	   dignity,	  other	  than	  that	  which	  one	  would	  condescend	  to	  give	  it.56	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Instead,	  instauration	  suggests	  the	  movement	  into	  being	  of	   ‘an	  existence	  considered	  in	   and	   of	   itself’.57	   Further,	   as	   a	   non-­‐isolated	   process	   of	   being,	   instauration	   is	  universal,	   constantly	   ongoing	   and	   interminable.	   For	   Souriau,	   as	   Fruteau	   de	   Laclos	  suggests,	   ‘[the]	  world	  was	  not	  there	  before	   instauration,	   it	   [the	  world]	   is	  produced	  by	  it	  [instauration]’.58	  Everything	  is	  being	  instaured	  and	  forming	  new	  instaurations	  in	  turn—even	  the	  consideration	  of	  a	  certain	  mode	  or	  form	  of	  existence,	  for	  example,	  is	  a	  collusion	  within	  the	  instauration	  of	  it,	  not	  physically	  but	  ontically	  participating	  in	   its	   being.	   Existence	   thus	   functions	   within	   a	   network	   of	   ongoing	   relations	   and	  interrelations,	   each	   of	   which	   ‘come	   together’	   to	   continually	   produce	   and	   redefine	  modal	  forms;	  a	  network	  predicated	  on	  the	  equality	  of	  different	  modes,	  each	  of	  which	  are	   independently	   instaured.59	   This	   is	   Souriau’s	  multimodalism,	   a	   state	   of	   existing	  across	  several	  of	   these	  modes	  coterminously.	  Latour	  describes	  quite	  poetically	   the	  difference	   between	   taking	  modes	   of	   existence	   in	   isolation	   and	  modes	   of	   existence	  within	  relation	  as	   ‘a	  bit	   like	  moving	  from	  a	  piano	  tuner	  who	  tries	  the	  notes	  one	  by	  one	  to	  the	  piano	  player	  who	  makes	  them	  all	  resonate	  in	  a	  melody’.60	  The	  autonomy	  of	  each	  mode	  is	  not	  compromised	  but	  reconfirmed,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  the	  relations	  between	  modes	  which	  sustain	  multimodal	  existence.	  As	  such,	  multimodalism	  offers	  Souriau	  the	   grounds	   to	   argue	   against	   philosophers	   who	   insist	   on	   a	   single	   mode	   as	  dominant—‘who	  continually	  exaggerate	  their	  preferred	  mode	  of	  existence’.61	  There	  is	   no	   hierarchical	   structure	   of	   existences.	   Rather,	   the	   multimodal	   is	   continually	  making	   new	   relations,	   or	   recreating	   old	   ones,	   through	   instauration	   as	   an	   ongoing	  process.	   Souriau	   suggests	   that	   one	   ‘could	   flatter	   oneself	   on	   having	   outlined	   a	  complete	  tableau	  of	  the	  modes	  of	  existence	  …	  [but	  note]	  this	  essential	  fact,	  precisely	  that	  the	  tableau	  is	  open’.62	  In	  this	  sense,	  then,	  interaction	  with	  a	  mode	  is	  a	  formative	  relation—‘the	  structure	  obtained	  [in	  such	  a	  tableau]	  depends	  above	  all	  on	  the	  order	  adopted	   for	   this	   research,	   this	   course	   of	   action’.63	   It	   is	   this	   relational	   state	   that	  Souriau	   emphasises,	   entering	   into	   an	   investigation	   of	   various	   modes	   in	   their	  complicity	  as	  well	  as	  their	  ontological	  uniqueness.	  Both	  Vitry	  Maubrey	  and	  Latour	  comment	   in	  detail	  on	  Souriau’s	  description	  of	  the	   phenomenon	   as	   a	   mode	   as	   essential	   to	   understanding	   his	   concept	   of	   modal	  being.	  To	  examine	  the	  phenomenon	  is	  to	  move	  towards	  the	  patuity	  that	  he	  indicates	  as	  essential	  to	  defining	  existence,	  in	  that	  the	  phenomenon	  in	  Souriau’s	  philosophy	  is	  patuity,	   to	   a	   greater	   or	   lesser	   extent.	   Souriau	   himself	   suggests	   the	   importance	   of	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understanding	   the	   phenomenon	   as	   implicated	   within	   the	   multimodal:	   ‘what	   does	  [the	   phenomenon]	   become	   when	   placed	   in	   relation	   to	   other	   modes?	   …	   Can	   one	  conceive	  of	  beings	   that	  have	  no	  relation	  with	   the	  phenomenon?’64	  Latour	  sees	   this	  mode	   as	   important	   in	   that	   it	   reconfirms	   this	   non-­‐subjective	   status	   in	   Souriau’s	  thinking.	  He	  makes	  an	  effort	  to	  illustrate	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Souriau’s	  philosophy	  goes	  against	  phenomenology:	  	  Let	   us	   recall	   that	   Souriau,	   like	   James,	   like	  Whitehead,	   is	   not	  moving	   in	   a	  bifurcated	  nature.	  What	  he	  calls	   the	  phenomenon	  has	  nothing	   to	  do	  with	  matter,	  with	   the	  plain	  empty	  object,	  used	  as	  a	  picture	  hook	   for	   the	  sickly	  subjectivity	   of	   the	   modernists.	   No,	   he	   just	   wants	   to	   capture	   the	  phenomenon	   independently	  of	  the	  badly-­‐formulated	  notion	  of	  matter,	  and	  without	  immediately	  engaging	  it	  in	  the	  eternal	  question	  of	  how	  much	  of	  it	  belongs	  to	  the	  object	  and	  how	  much	  to	  the	  subject.65	  	  The	  phenomenon	  then	  for	  Souriau	   is	   felt	  only	   ‘when	  one	  feels	   it	  as	  supporting	  and	  upholding	   in	   itself	   that	   which	   leans	   on	   and	   consolidates	   itself	   in	   it,	   with	   it	   and	  through	   it’.66	  As	  Latour	  describes,	   ‘the	  phenomenon	   [is]	  well	   and	   truly	   freed	  of	   its	  Procrustean	   bed;	   it	   can	   reply	   to	   its	   own	   terms	   of	   reference,	   it	   can	   finally	   lead	   to	  relations	   one	   could	   call	   lateral	   as	   opposed	   to	   only	   transversal	   relations’.67	  Within	  this,	  we	  can	  feel	  Souriau’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  autonomy	  of	  each	  mode,	  and	  its	  nature	  as	  unique;	  but	  also	  the	  potential	  for	  multimodality.	  This	  movement	  towards	  an	  individual	  mode	  is	  thus	  characterised	  by	  that	  which	  Latour	  refers	  to	  as	  Souriau’s	  intent	  focus	  on	  ‘obtaining	  being	  by	  way	  of	  the	  other’.68	  As	  Souriau	  describes	  his	  method,	  one	  must	  ‘depart	  from	  a	  given	  ontology	  that	  is	  as	  restrained	  as	  possible,	  and	  seek	  out	  by	  what	  shifts	  and	  what	  links	  (representative	  of	  new	   modes	   of	   existence)	   one	   might	   pass	   into	   otherness’.69	   Latour	   compares	   this	  notion	   of	   otherness	   to	   a	   set	   of	   individual	   constraints	   within	   each	   mode,	   an	   ontic	  ‘pattern’	  felt	  out	  in	  granting	  each	  mode	  ‘the	  capacity	  to	  produce	  in	  its	  own	  way	  the	  assemblage	  of	  ontological	  categories	  which	  are	  its	  very	  own’.70	  Souriau	  contrasts	  his	  position	   in	   this	   way	   to	   a	   ‘phenomenological	   reductionism’,	   which	   ‘puts	   the	  phenomenon	   itself	   in	   parenthesis’,	   rather	   than	   focusing	   on	   it	   in	   its	   own	   right.71	  Phenomenology,	  he	  argues,	  is	  the	  last	  place	  one	  will	  find	  the	  phenomenon	  itself.	  He	  describes	  it	  as:	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a	  bastardised	  form	  of	  thinking,	  where	  one	  looks	  for	  the	  phenomenon	  at	  the	  same	   time	   as	   leaving	   it	   behind.	   It	   supposes	   the	   phenomenon	   dissected.	  Drained	   of	   its	   blood,	   and	   surrounded	   by	   its	   organs.	   To	   take	   it	   in	   living	  form,	   the	   phenomenon	   posits	   in	   its	   phenomenal	   state	   its	   intentions	   and	  other	  factors	  of	  its	  reality.72	  	  His	  project	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  as	  agential.	   ‘One	  can	  inversely	  centre	  all	  this	  [‘the	  existential	  shifts	  and	  morphemic	  attachments	  which	  drive,	   from	  the	  pure	  phenomenon,	   towards	   other	   realities	   in	   other	  modes’]	   systematically	   on	   the	   pure	  phenomenon,	  and	   install	   it	  at	   the	  centre	   in	  order	   to	   feel	   it	   support	  and	  respond	  to	  the	  rest’.73	  This	  ‘othering’	  that	  Souriau	  calls	  on	  us	  to	  attempt	  is	  key	  to	  his	  philosophy:	  the	  attempt	   to	  hold	  a	  mode	  other	   than	  our	  own	  subjectivity	   as	   centred	  within	   the	  mapping	  of	  that	  same	  mode’s	  existential	  tenor.	  Vitry	  Maubrey	  sees	  much	  of	  Souriau’s	  philosophy	  as	  bound	  in	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  thought	  as	  a	  phenomenon;	  one	  running	  against	  traditional	  schools	  of	  philosophy,	  and	   ‘searching	   for	   ways	   to	   disentangle	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   thought	   from	   the	  logocentric	   and	   anthropomorphic	   assumptions	   which	   have	   traditionally	   either	  bound	   it	   into	   subservience	   to	   the	   thinking	   subject	   or	   exalted	   it	   into	   an	   ultimate	  equation	  with	  Being’.74	  In	  this,	  we	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Souriau	  emerges	  from	  a	  radicalisation	  of	  the	  Kantian	  reversal,	  going	  beyond	  the	  notion	  that	  thought	   is	   a	   strictly	   earthly	   phenomenon	   to	   suggest	   that	   it	   is	   ‘a	   phenomenon	   sui	  
generis	  (of	  which	  man	  is	  only	  the	  occasional	  cause)	  which	  draws	  both	  its	  form	  and	  its	  content	  from	  the	  existential	  complex	  from	  which	  it	  emanates’.75	  This	  leads	  into	  a	  reconfiguration	  too	  of	  the	  subject,	  refuting	  Descartes’	  ‘I	  think,	  therefore	  I	  am’	  as	  too	  heavily	  centred	  on	  the	  self.	   ‘According	  to	  Souriau,	  Descartes	  should	  not	  have	  taken	  for	  granted	  that	  existence	  posits	  the	  I	  as	  common	  subject	  of	  the	  I	  think	  and	  the	  I	  am,	  because	   it	   implies	   looking	   at	   evidence	   from	   the	   viewpoint	   of	   a	   historicised	   Ego.’76	  For	  Souriau,	  thinking	  does	  not	  constitute	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  ‘I’,	  but	  represents	  ‘the	  plurality	   of	   ontological	   acts	  which	   posit	   and	   concretize	   the	   individual	   existence’.77	  This	  is	  the	  foundation	  for	  Souriau’s	  modal	  discourse	  of	  ontology,	  but	  it	  leads	  us	  also	  to	   appreciate	   the	   radical	   empiricism	   at	   play	   within	   his	   work.	   The	   patuity	   which	  Souriau	   sees	   as	   signalling	   existence	   is	   necessarily	   based	   within	   experience,	   as	   a	  manifestation	   within	   a	   certain	   moment	   in	   time.	   Vitry	   Maubrey,	   in	   somewhat	  grandiose	  terms,	  supports	  this	  notion.	  The	  ‘experience	  of	  the	  patefit’	   is	   ‘empirically	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grounded	  …	  This	  lived	  instant,	  in	  its	  actuality	  of	  “instant-­‐that-­‐is”,	  Souriau	  perceives	  as	  the	  cosmic	  opening	  where	  the	  “noumenal”	  makes	  its	  “phenomenal’	  entrance”.78	  Latour	   similarly	   engages	   with	   Souriau’s	   work	   from	   a	   position	   of	   radical	  empiricism.	  He	  explores	  Souriau’s	  notion	  of	  prepositions,	  via	  Whitehead	  and	  James,	  as	   central	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   modal	   existence.	   The	   opening	   passages	   of	   Latour’s	  ‘Reflections	  on	  Etienne	  Souriau’s	  Les	  differents	  modes	  d’existence’	   take	   from	   James’	  
Principles	   of	   Psychology	   to	   support	   the	   weight	   of	   prepositions	   in	   the	   radical	  empiricist	  version	  of	  experience.79	  Latour	  suggests	  that:	  	  the	  relations	  are	  numberless,	  and	  no	  existing	  language	  is	  capable	  of	  doing	  justice	  to	  all	  their	  shades.	  We	  ought	  to	  say	  a	  feeling	  of	  and,	  a	  feeling	  of	  if,	  a	  feeling	   of	  but,	   and	   a	   feeling	   of	  by,	  quite	   as	   readily	   as	  we	   say	   a	   feeling	   of	  
blue,	  a	  feeling	  of	  cold.80	  	  These	   relations,	   then,	   assert	   that	   normative	   empiricism	   is	   limited	   in	   taking	   into	  account	  only	  elementary	  sensory	  data,	  giving	  rise	  to	  ‘a	  “bifurcated”	  nature’	  insisting	  on	  the	   ‘strict	  separation	  of	  subjectivity	  and	  objectivity’.81	  Latour	  describes	  this	  as	  a	  ‘huge	   reduction	   on	  what	   is	   accessible	   to	   experience’,	   scathingly	   describing	   subject	  and	  object	  as	  ‘the	  two	  hooks	  used	  to	  suspend	  a	  hammock	  destined	  for	  philosophical	  snoozing’.82	  Rather	  than	  taking	  the	  preposition	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  that	  patuity	  which	  he	   sees	   as	   signalling	   existence,	   Souriau	   suggests	   its	   capacity	   to	   point	   towards	   the	  ‘patefit’.	  He	  allows	  them	  ‘true	  existences’,	  but	  their	  agency	  is	  held	  in	  their	  power	  to	  infer	   or	   lead	   towards	   the	   appreciation	   of	   a	   mode	   of	   existence	   in	   that	   which	   the	  preposition	  modifies:83	  here	  the	  preposition	  does	  not	  indicate	  an	  ontological	  domain,	  nor	  a	  region,	  a	  territory,	  a	  sphere	  or	  a	  material.	  The	  if	  or	  the	  and	  has	  no	  region.	  But,	  as	  its	  name	  perfectly	  indicates,	  the	  preposition	  prepares	  the	  position	  that	  has	  to	   be	   given	   to	   what	   follows,	   giving	   the	   search	   for	   meaning	   a	   definite	  inflection,	  which	  will	  allow	  one	  to	  judge	  its	  direction	  or	  its	  vector.84	  This,	   it	   can	   be	   assumed,	   is	   born	   of	   his	   ‘respect	   for	   experience	   as	   given	   through	  prepositions’.85	   In	   aligning	   himself	   to	   James’s	   representation	   of	   relation,	   Souriau	  suggests	   the	   potential	   of	   prepositions	   to	   provide	   a	   ‘grammar	   of	   existence’	   to	   be	  decoded	   in	  approaching	  modality.	  The	  radically	  empirical	   ‘feeling	  of	  by’	   that	   James	  highlights	   is	  not	   lost,	   but	   seen	   in	   its	  potential	   for	  multimodal	   relation.86	  As	  Latour	  describes	  it,	  the	  preposition	  ‘defines	  a	  way	  to	  make	  sense	  that	  differs	  from	  the	  others	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…	  to	  identify	  the	  tonality	  in	  which	  we	  must	  take	  what	  follows’.87	  Souriau’s	  project	  is	  to	   follow	   these	   relations	   towards	   unique	   modes.	   The	   aim	   Latour	   suggests	   in	   his	  work	   is	   to	   ask	   whether	   one	   can	   ‘carry	   out	   serious	   research	   on	   relations’:88	   ‘if	  relations,	   and	   in	  particular	  prepositions,	   are	   given	   to	  us	   in	   experience,	  where	   then	  are	   they	   leading	   us?’89	   Souriau’s	   understanding	   of	   prepositions	   paves	   the	  way	   for	  Latour	   to	   make	   further	   developments	   in	   radical	   empiricism.	   He	   moves	   through	  Souriau	   to	   see	   	   prepositional	   relations	   as	   signalling	   existences	   ‘without	   requiring	  them	  immediately	  to	  align	  themselves	   in	  one	  and	  only	  one	  direction	   leading	  either	  towards	  the	  object	  (away	  from	  the	  subject)	  or	  towards	  the	  subject	  (away	  from	  the	  object)’.90	   He	   follows	   this	   in	   An	   Inquiry,	   suggesting	   early	   in	   his	   work	   that	  prepositions	  ‘are	  neither	  the	  origin	  nor	  the	  source	  nor	  the	  principle	  nor	  the	  power,	  and	  yet	  they	  cannot	  be	  reduced,	  either,	  to	  the	  courses	  to	  be	  followed	  themselves’.91	  They	  offer	   instead	   the	   ‘interpretive	  key’92	   of	   the	  mode	   to	   follow,	  determining	  how	  we	  are	  to	  approach	  each	  unique	  existence.	  Approaching	  unique	  existences—this	  is	  the	  shape	  contemporary	  applications	  of	  Souriau’s	  thought	  are	  beginning	  to	  take.	  Latour’s	  Inquiry	  seeks	  to	  populate	  the	  world	  of	   the	  moderns	  with	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  existences,	  each	   in	  their	  own	  key.	   In	  Australia,	  Stephen	   Muecke	   has	   applied	   the	   ideas	   of	   both	   Latour	   and	   Souriau	   in	   critique	   of	  contemporary	   practice.	   In	   ‘Motorcycles,	   Snails,	   Latour:	   Criticism	   without	  Judgement’,93	   he	   reads	   their	   philosophy	   alongside	   Indigenous	   philosophy	   and	  Australian	   cultural	   studies	   to	   suggest	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   judgement	   might	   be	  challenged	   as	   a	   critical	   practice.	   Muecke	   takes	   issue	   with	   the	   prevalence	   of	   the	  subject–object	  relationship	  in	  criticism	  as	  decisive	  or	  definitive,	  and	  seeks	  to	  move	  away	   from	   ‘phenomenological	  orthodoxy	  …	  co-­‐relating	  self	  and	  other’.94	  His	  article	  directly	  responds	  to	  Latour’s	  engagement	  with	  the	  existential	  pluralism	  of	  Souriau’s	  philosophy.	  Muecke’s	  writing	   embraces	  multiplicity	   in	   connection	   and	   emphasises	  the	  experiential	  over	  critical	  judgement.	  He	  demands	  a	  criticism	  which	  ‘participates	  in	  worlds’,95	   rather	   than	   one	  which	   situates	   itself	   as	   uninvolved.	   Like	   Souriau	   and	  Latour,	   he	   suggests	   that	   ‘it	   is	   in	   the	   compositions,	   not	   the	   entities,	   that	   the	  power	  lies’,96	  thus	  resisting	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Australian	  political	  and	  cultural	  aesthetics	  ‘work	   towards	   the	   intensification	   of	   relationships	   between	   subject	   and	   object’.97	  Muecke	  understands	  Souriau	  as	  part	  of	  a	  wider	  ‘Vitalist’	  school	  which	  ‘emerges	  from	  its	  roots	   in	  Spinoza,	  Bergson	  and	  Diderot,	  continues	  via	  Deleuze	  and	  Guattari,	   then	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William	  James	  and	  A.N.	  Whitehead’.98	  His	  application	  of	  their	  thought	  seeks	  to	  offer	  an	   ‘experimental’	   criticism,	   seeing	  Vitalism	  as	   ‘an	  alternative	   thread	   in	   continental	  philosophy	  which	   seeks	   to	  provide	   (hopefully)	   a	  more	   realistic	   vision	  of	   collective	  assemblages	  of	  life-­‐forms,	  where	  the	  human	  (paradoxically	  for	  the	  humanities)	  finds	  itself	  less	  centred.’99	  	  This	  in	  part	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  creative	  practice:	  exploring	  his	  relationship	  with	  his	  own	  motorcycle,	  Muecke	  offers	  a	  writing	  which	   is	   ‘actively	  engaged	   in	  creative	  [sic]	   assemblages	   or	   compositions	   as	   it	   goes	   along’.100	   He	   puts	   forward	   an	  appreciation	   of	   the	   world	   wherein	   the	   abstract	   and	   the	   concrete	   touch,	   make	  friends,	   hold	   hands.	   Denying	   the	   singularity	   of	   the	   subject–object	   relationship,	   he	  celebrates	  ‘a	  feeling	  of	  the	  immanence	  of	  life	  in	  and	  through	  worlds	  that	  fold	  in	  and	  through	  each	  other	  again	  and	  across	  time,	  life	  being	  movement	  and	  growth’.101	  This	  immanence	   informs	   his	   creative	   practice,	   which	   he	   refers	   to	   as	   ‘object-­‐oriented	  
writing’,	   writing	   in	   an	   awareness	   of	   relation,	   writing	   from	   within	   a	   multimodal	  network.102	  He	  attempts	  to	  allow	  for	  the	  agency	  and	  evolution	  of	  modes	  other	  than	  the	  self,	  and	  overcomes	  the	  distance	  of	  critical	  judgement.	  This	  returns	  us	  once	  again	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  participation—not	  far	  from	  the	  process	  Souriau	  puts	  forward	  for	  the	  exploration	   of	   a	   mode,	   an	   understanding	   based	   on	   the	   ‘existential	   shifts	   and	  morphemic	   attachments’,	   which	   ultimately	   depends	   on	   our	   participation	   in	   the	  mode’s	  existence	  and	  our	  perception	  of	  its	  agency.103	  Muecke	  combines	  this	  ‘object-­‐oriented	  writing’	  with	  an	  awareness	  of	  Indigenous	  Australian	  philosophy	  to	  offer	  an	  alternative,	   non-­‐judgemental	   form	  of	   criticism.	  He	  highlights	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  Indigenous	   thinking	   ‘allow[s]	   for	   non-­‐human	   modes	   as	   of	   existence	   and	   radical	  transformations	  from	  the	  human	  to	  the	  non-­‐human,	  and	  vice-­‐versa’.104	  Even	  while	  it	  engages	  directly	  with	  Australian	  culture,	  then,	  Muecke’s	  work	  indicates	  the	  manner	  in	   which	   Souriau’s	   multimodalism	   offers	   various	   possibilities	   as	   a	   critical	  framework.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  participation	  moreover	  ties	  in	  with	  Muecke’s	  wider	  project.	  In	  ‘Can	  You	  Argue	  with	  the	  Honeysuckle?’,	  Muecke	  challenges	  critical	  constructions	  of	  landscape.	  He	  underlines	  a	  mode	  of	  being	  which	   is	  sustained	  not	   in	   the	  dialectic—the	   ‘Honeysuckle’	   place	   ‘does	   not	   produce	   an	   argument	   about	   something’—but	   in	  poetic	   connection,	   flowing	   incessantly	   and	   thus	   producing	   as	   well	   as	   sustaining	  life.105	   In	   this,	   he	   emphasises	   a	   construction	   of	   landscape	   that	   is	   nonlinear:	   an	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‘atemporal	  “space”’,	  wherein	  existence	  is	  no	  longer	  purely	  ontological	  but	  based	  in	  a	  poetics	  of	  doing.106	   ‘Ultinteraka	   is	  working	  away	  continually	  …	   Instead	  of	  being,	  he	  does.	  In	  the	  place	  of	  his	  existence,	  an	  event	  is	  always	  happening.’107	  For	  Muecke,	  this	  way	   of	   seeing	   the	   world	   ‘works	   because	   of	   a	   connectivity	   that	   releases	   a	  possibility’.108	   He	   is	   taking	   up,	   in	   his	   words,	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   ‘Aboriginal	  cosmologies	  incorporate	  a	  non-­‐human-­‐being-­‐centred	  view	  of	  the	  world,	  which	  also	  tends	  to	  be	  an	  ecological	  one.	  “Man”	  is	   just	  one	  living	  being	  among	  plants,	  animals,	  even	   the	   inanimate	   environment	   …	   whose	   encounters	   create	   surprising	  relationships	   full	   of	   potentiality.’109	   Muecke	   also	   points	   to	   a	   conceptualisation	   of	  construction	  of	  place	  which	  takes	  up	  the	  double	  meaning	  of	  the	  French	  verb	  ‘faire’—to	   do	   and	   to	   make.	   This	   reaches	   towards	   the	   exploration	   of	   instauration	   in	  ‘Motorcycles,	  Snails,	  Latour:	  Criticism	  without	  Judgement’.	  His	  emphasis	  on	  action—‘doing’—as	  offering	  identity	  subverts	  the	  relationship	  between	  subject	  and	  object	  in	  that	   neither	   can	   be	   passive.	   Constant	   action	   similarly	   constitutes	   a	   form	   of	  instauration,	   in	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   it	   embraces,	   encourages	   and	   even	   sustains	  relations	  with	  other	  modes	  of	  being.	  It	  has	  the	  capacity	  too	  for	  making	  new	  relations,	  ‘a	  life	  force,	  going	  out	  and	  increasing,	  and	  not	  closed	  in	  on	  itself’.110	  As	  a	  vision	  of	  the	  world,	   this	  application	  of	  Souriau’s	  philosophy	  opens	  new	  possibilities	   in	   criticism	  for	  Muecke.	  For	  example,	  Muecke’s	  latest	  work,	  ‘Reproductive	  Aesthetics:	  Multiple	  Realities	  in	   a	   Seamus	   Heaney	   Poem’,	   a	   chapter	   in	   Chris	   Danta	   and	   Helen	   Groth’s	  Mindful	  
Aesthetics:	  Literature	  and	   the	  Science	  of	  Mind,	   applies	  Souriau’s	  vitalism	  within	   the	  sphere	  of	  a	  literary	  reading.	  He	  argues	  that	  ‘a	  literary	  work	  is	  not	  a	  kind	  of	  language	  
bridge	   between	   subject	   and	   object.	   Rather,	   its	   tentacles	   extend	   in	   all	   sorts	   of	  directions	  where	  the	  text’s	  relations	  expand	  into	  an	  empirical	  multi-­‐realist	  world.’111	  Ultimately,	  he	  is	  taking	  up	  Latour’s	  questions	  as	  to	  how	  we	  might	  interact	  with	  the	  beings	   of	   fiction:	   By	   what	   relation	   can	   we	   know	   them?	   What	   continues	   their	  existence	  in	  the	  world?	  These	  are	  particularly	  pertinent	  questions	  when	  considering	  texts	   with	   immediate	   social	   and	   cultural	   impact—like	   Richard	   Flanagan’s	  Narrow	  
Road	  to	  the	  Deep	  North.112	  As	  a	  Man	  Booker	  Prize	  winner,	  the	  text	  has	  developed	  an	  existence	   in	  Australian	   society	   that	   encompasses	  all	   sorts	  of	   things	   in	   its	  network,	  from	   publicists	   on	   morning	   television	   programs	   to	   war	   veterans,	   international	  publishing	   to	   family	   history.	   While	   Latour	   considers	   these	   questions	   from	   a	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philosophical	  standpoint,	  Muecke	  develops	  a	  practice	  before	   the	   text.	  He	  describes	  the	   complex	   ecology	   surrounding	   a	   text	   as	   a	   ‘space	   of	   negotiation	   and	  transformation	   that	  does	  not	  privilege	   either	   subject	   or	  object.	  The	   story	  or	  poem	  does	   not	   exist	  primarily	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   subjectivities	   (phenomenology),	   nor	  
primarily	  in	  relation	  to	  objects	  (materialism).	  It	  has	  its	  own	  existence	  not	  reducible	  to	  either	  of	   those	  privileged	  poles	   in	   the	  modernist	  conceptual	  architecture.’113	  His	  reading	  retreats	  from	  human	  centrality	  in	  the	  poetic	  experience,	  following	  Latour’s	  notion	  of	  the	  equality	   in	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  subject	  and	  the	  beings	  of	   fiction:	  ‘isn’t	   there	   always	   devilish	   language	   getting	   in	   the	   way,	   triangulating	   and	  threatening	  to	  make	  English	  speakers,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  centre	  of	  everything?	  In	  order	  to	  say	  no,	  I	  have	  to	  elaborate	  the	  claim	  that	  some	  poetic	  relations	  are	  not	  linguistic.’114	  The	   text	   is	   no	   longer	  made	   object	   by	   this	   reading,	   it	   is	   allowed	   vitality—readings	  cannot	   be	   understood	   by	   ‘metaphors	   of	   depth	   or	   transcendence,	   just	   a	   ceaseless	  trying	  of	  things	  out	  with	  others’.115	  Flanagan’s	  Narrow	  Road	  offers	  an	  example.	  Where	  Muecke	  focuses	  on	  the	  chain	  of	   associations	   possible	   in	   reading	   Seamus	   Heaney’s	   ‘Fosterage’,	   Flanagan’s	   novel	  offers	  a	  poetic	  relation	  which	  conveys	  a	  sensation	  of	  splitting.	  In	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  text,	   in	   the	   starkness	   of	   its	   prose,	   in	   the	   recurring	   theme	   of	   the	   inexpressible,	   the	  movements	   of	   the	   text	   offer	  multiple	  moments	   of	   divergence	   and	   separation.	   For	  example,	  the	  poetic	  experience	  of	  the	  image	  of	  a	  shin,	  ulcerated,	  the	  bone	  ‘starting	  to	  rot	  and	  break	  off	   into	  flakes’,	   is	  made	  stark	  by	  the	  immediacy	  of	  the	  image	  closing,	  the	  white	  space	  which	  follows	  shortly	  after	  the	  brief	  episode.116	  Muecke	  focuses	  on	  tracing	  the	  specific	  relations	  a	  poem	  makes	  with	  other	  existences,	   ‘virtual	  humans,	  things,	   other	   texts,	   history	   and	   even	   the	   sacred’;117	   in	   Narrow	   Road,	   the	   writing	  enters	   into	   relation	   with	   social	   narratives,	   silences	   and	   physical	   sensations	   all	  through	   this	   poetics	   of	   splitting.	   The	   reactions	   the	   text	   invokes	  within	   the	   subject	  are	  felt	  through	  the	  body:	  it	  moves	  me,	  it	  makes	  me	  breathe	  deeply.	  With	  each	  split,	  each	   break,	   the	   text	   invokes	   failure	   in	   existence,	   splitting	   in	   its	   literal	   sense	   as	   a	  break	  in	  relation	  and/or	  instauration.	  Latour	  points	  out	  in	  his	  reading	  of	  Souriau	  the	  capacity	   for	   failure	   in	   vitality.	   Ontological	   networks	   encapsulate	   a	   ‘fragile	   set	   of	  
connections	   that	   has	   value	   only	   provided	   that	   it	   is	   regularly	  maintained’.118	  When	  Muecke	   asks	  what	   ‘are	   all	   the	   heterogeneous	   things	   that	  make	   a	   poem	   come	   into	  existence	  and	  then	  help	  it	  stay	  alive?’,	  he	  is	  in	  effect	  tipping	  his	  hat	  to	  this	  possibility	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of	  failure,	  of	  losing	  the	  status	  of	  existence.119	  Perhaps,	  then,	  this	  sensation	  offers	  an	  interpretive	   key,	   a	  modal	   characteristic—manifestation	   of	   ‘life’s	   tendency	   towards	  splitting	  and	  diremption’.120	  Claire	  Colebrook	  sees	  this	  as	  one	  capacity	  of	  art,	   ‘there	  is	  something	  that	  is	  mindless	  and	  countervital	  in	  the	  aesthetic,	  a	  potential	  in	  the	  art	  object	  for	  detachment’.121	  Reading	  Narrow	  Road	  in	  this	  light	  emphasises	  the	  manner	  the	   writing	   pulls	   away	   from	   the	   reader.	   The	   narrative	   builds	   through	   gaps	   and	  fragments.	   And	   in	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   inexpressible,	   ‘the	   mystery’,	   the	   constant	  suspicion	  that	  to	  life	  ‘no	  meaning	  could	  ever	  be	  attached’,	  there	  is	  an	  active	  denial	  of	  subjective	   relation	   with	   the	   reader.122	   The	   text	   is	   paradoxically	   ‘kept	   alive’	   in	   its	  refusal	   to	   live	   out	   the	   existence	   expected	  of	   it,	   entering	   into	   relation	  with	   a	  wider	  discourse	  of	  the	  inexpressible	  in	  the	  social	  and	  historical	  narratives	  which	  surround	  the	  POW	  experience.	  When	  Dorrigo	  notes	  the	  ‘biographies,	  plays	  and	  documentaries	  …	  veneration,	  hagiographies,	  adulation’,	  the	  text	  is	  opening	  to	  narratives	  and	  beings	  which	   energise	   it,	   sustain	   it.123	   The	   building	   of	   these	   as	   a	   list	   points	   to	   a	   larger	  narrative	  again,	  a	  network	  of	   social	   relation.	  There	   is	   something	  more	   in	   this	   than	  the	   linguistic	   representation	   of	   life.	   There	   are	   experiences	   which	   have	   their	   own	  ontological	  status—the	  text	  met	  with	  ‘as	  traces	  of	  life	  engendered	  by	  partners’.124	  Reading	  practices	  which	  engage	  with	  an	  ontological	  pluralism	  are	  attempting	  to	  renew,	  re-­‐energise,	  critical	  practices	  in	  generating	  vitality.	  This	  is	  about	  feeling	  out	  ‘specific,	  working	  and	  perhaps	  unexpected	  partnerships	  [with	  the	  text]	  (which	  have	  nothing	  to	  do	  with	  representations	  which	  imply	  a	  gap,	  between	  referent	  and	  sign,	  for	  example)’.125	  Muecke’s	  writing	   illustrates	  a	   concerted	  effort	   to	   speculate	   in	  and	  on	  criticism	  as	  a	  practice.	  He	  offers	  the	  ‘new	  ontological	  and	  social	  possibilities’	  and	  the	  ‘new	   discourses’	   that	   Lyn	   McCredden	   calls	   for—answering	   her	   challenge	   to	   ‘re-­‐
imagine	   and	   re-­‐write	   the	   nation	   in	   ways	   that	   offer	   vital	   alternatives’.126	   And	   the	  alternatives	  that	  Muecke	  offers	  are	  ‘vital’	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  engage	  with	  a	  vision	  of	   the	   world	   based	   in	   an	   appreciation	   of	   existence	   as	   an	   instaurative	   force,	  constantly	   generating	   new	   relationships	   between	   heretofore	   unacknowledged	  actors.	  He	  seeks	  out	  ‘unique	  pathways	  in	  and	  among	  the	  multiply-­‐real’,	  recognising,	  as	   Latour	   and	   Souriau	   have,	   that	   ‘things	   can	   exist	  without	   being	   a	   function	   of	   the	  way	   humans	   look	   at	   the	  world,	   as	   if	   everything	   hung	   off	   that	   relationship’.127	   His	  work	  thus	  is	  ultimately	  based	  in	  the	  equality	  of	  modes	  that	  Souriau	  insists	  on.	  This	  is	  the	   relevance	   of	   a	   ‘forgotten’	   French	  philosopher—not	   only	   in	   the	   potential	   of	   his	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thought,	  but	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  unexpected	  relations	  it	  invokes	  force	  us	  to	  rethink	  criticism	  as	  a	  practice.	  Souriau	  makes	  clear	   that	  we	  are	  participating	   in	  an	  instauration	  in	  engaging	  with	  his	  work.	  Our	  criticism	  too,	  then,	  is	  instaurative.	  What	  avenues,	   what	   relationships	   does	   it	   open	   up?	  What	   relationships	   can	   we	   actively	  seek	  to	  open?	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